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KELO, LINGLE, AND SAN REMO HOTEL:
TAKINGS LAW NOW BELONGS TO THE STATES
William A. Fletcher*
I. INTRODUCTION
Thank you for inviting me to speak to you this morning to
open this timely symposium and to join so many talented and
knowledgeable panelists. I am flattered to have been invited
and am delighted to be here. In your program I am listed as
having taught Federal Courts, Civil Procedure, and
Constitutional Law. That is true, but I have a dirty little
secret: for the first ten years of my career at Boalt, I also
taught Property. I am happy to be back in this familiar and
interesting part of the legal world.
Last term, the Supreme Court decided three extremely
important takings cases. Even one of them would have been
an event. The cases are Kelo v. City of New London,1 Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A, Inc.,' and San Remo Hotel v. City & County of
San Francisco.3 Kelo will be the focus for most of the rest of
the day, so I will try not to let it take too much of my time.
Lingle and San Remo Hotel are not front and center for the
rest of today's symposium, but I will give them equal time in
my opening remarks. Not only are these two cases important
in their own right, but they also tell us some quite
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Richard
W. Jennings, Jr., Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California School of
Law (Boalt Hall); J.D., Yale Law School, 1975; B.A., Oxford University, 1970;
B.A., Harvard College, 1968.
1. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
2. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
3. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491
(2005).
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remarkable things when considered in combination with Kelo.
II. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON
First, Kelo, a true takings case. The City of New London,
Connecticut, is a blue-collar town on the coast of eastern
Connecticut at the mouth of the Thames River.4 The Coast
Guard Academy is just upriver. Connecticut College,
formerly Connecticut College for Women, is just outside of
town. The Electric Boat division of General Dynamics, which
manufactures nuclear submarines, is just across the river in
Groton, Connecticut. A United States Navy submarine base
is upriver from New London, on the Groton side of the river.
The base had been on a recent list of recommended base
closures, but has been saved, at least for now.5
New London, like a number of formerly prosperous towns
in Connecticut, has been economically depressed for some
years.6 The New London Development Corporation, a private
nonprofit entity, was reactivated in the late 1990s to help
plan for economic development.7 Two bond issues were
authorized to assist in planning for an area near Fort
Trumbull, a waterfront site just downriver from downtown
that had been recently abandoned by the Navy.' In February
1998, the pharmaceutical company Pfizer announced plans to
build a $300 million research facility near Fort Trumbull. 9
After about a year of planning, the city council authorized the
Development Corporation to purchase approximately ninety
acres near the anticipated Pfizer facility and Fort Trumbull
by private negotiation, if possible, or by eminent domain, if
necessary.1 ° The ninety acres were intended to be used for a
conference hotel, an office building, a riverwalk, office space,
retail shops, a Coast Guard museum, and about eighty new
private residences."
Some property owners in the ninety-acre area refused to
4. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
5. Jesse Hamilton, Navy Releases Construction Funds; Groton Sub Base to
Get $54 Million, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 30, 2005, at B7.
6. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
7. Id. at 2659.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2659-60.
11. Id. at 2659.
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sell and brought suit, claiming that the condemnation of their
properties would violate the "public use" requirement of the
Fifth Amendment. 12 Some of the plaintiffs were sympathetic
representatives of white, middle America.'3 For example,
plaintiff Wilhelmina Dery was born in her house. 4 She and
her husband had lived there since their marriage sixty years
earlier. 5 By a vote of five to four, the United States Supreme
Court upheld the condemnation, holding that the uses to
which the ninety acres were to be put were "public" within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 16
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion. Justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas, dissented. Justice Stevens relied
primarily on two cases in which the Court had held that the
challenged projects came within the "public use" requirement.
First, he relied on Berman v. Parker,7 in which the Court
upheld a "slum clearance" project in an extremely poor, 97.5%
black neighborhood in southwest Washington, D.C.18 Second,
he relied on Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 9 in which
the Court upheld a Hawaii statute under which private
landowners were obliged to sell their properties in fee simple
at fair market value to their lessees.2 °
As Justice O'Connor pointed out in her vigorous dissent,
both Berman and Midkiff could be distinguished from Kelo as
dealing with severe problems posed by existing land uses.2'
In Berman, the problem was that the condemned area was, in
the jargon of land-use planning, severely "blighted."22  In
Midkiff, the problem was that land ownership was
concentrated in very few hands.23 The state and federal
government owned 49% of the land in Hawaii, and only




16. Id. at 2668.
17. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
18. Id. at 36; see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663, 2665 (discussing Berman, 348
U.S. at 30).
19. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
20. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663-64.
21. Id. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
23. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232, 245; see also Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (discussing Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229).
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seventy-two private landowners owned an additional 47%.24
On Oahu, the most populated island, only twenty-two
landowners owned 72.5% of the fee simple private land.25
Justice Stevens stated forthrightly that the ninety-acre parcel
in New London was not "blighted" and that there was no
problem concerning concentration of land ownership. 26 But
the Kelo majority nonetheless held that the condemnation in
New London came within the principle established by
Berman and Midkiff.27
III. LINGLE V. CHEVRON U.S.A., INC.
Second, Lingle,28 a so-called regulatory takings case.
Concerned about the high retail price of gasoline, the State of
Hawaii passed a statute controlling rents charged by gasoline
refiners and wholesalers to retail gasoline dealers who leased
their stations from the refiners and wholesalers.29 The stated
purpose of the statute was to lower retail gasoline prices by
lowering the dealers' costs.3 0
The Ninth Circuit held that the statute was a "regulatory
taking" if it did not "substantially advance a legitimate state
interest.'31 In other words, if the rent control statute did not
"substantially advance" the purpose of lowering the retail
price of gasoline, it was invalid. I was on that Ninth Circuit
panel and disagreed with my colleagues. I contended that the
only means-end test that should be applied was the
"reasonableness" standard applied to ordinary price-control
legislation under the Due Process Clause.32
On remand from the Ninth Circuit, the district court held
a hearing in which two economists testified. One concluded
that the rent control statute "substantially advanced" the
purpose of lowering retail gasoline prices, 3 and the other
24. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
25. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232).
26. See id. at 2664-65.
27. See id. at 2665.
28. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
29. Id. at 2078.
30. Id.
31. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1033-37 (9th Cir.
2000), rev'd sub nom. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
32. Id. at 1043, 1048-49 (W. Fletcher, J., concurring).
33. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1888 (D.
Haw. 2002) (testimony of Professor Keith Leffler).
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concluded the opposite. 4 The district court found, as a
matter of fact, after considering the substance of the
economists' testimony, as well as their demeanor (!), that the
rent control statute did not substantially advance the purpose
of lowering retail gasoline prices." The district court
therefore struck down the rent control statute as an
uncompensated taking. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the
panel again split.3 7 Two judges affirmed the district court's
factual finding as not clearly erroneous.3 I dissented, again
contending that the proper test was the reasonableness test. 9
The "substantially advances a legitimate state purpose
test" was first articulated by the Supreme Court in a land use
case, Agins v. City of Tiburon. ° In that case, the Court held
that an open space zoning ordinance in Marin County,
California, constituted an unlawful taking if it (1) did not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest, 41 or (2)
denied a landowner all economically viable use of his land.
As articulated in Agins, the two parts of the test were
independent: a zoning ordinance was an unconstitutional
regulatory taking if either of the two criteria were met.
4 3
In a remarkable turnabout, the Supreme Court in Lingle
unanimously disavowed the "substantially advances" test in
all regulatory takings cases, including zoning cases.4 Now,
after the Court's decision in Lingle, a regulation is a taking
only if it effectively denies the landowner all economically
viable use of his or her land, as, for example, in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council.4 5  The "substantially
34. See id. at 1187-88 (testimony of Professor John Umbeck).
35. Id. at 1188-89, 1191-92.
36. Id. at 1193.
37. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Lingle, 363 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd
sub nom. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
38. See id. at 848-58.
39. See id. at 858-61 (W. Fletcher, J., dissenting).
40. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
41. Id. at 260 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
42. Id. (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138
n.36 (1978)).
43. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2005) ("Because
this statement is phrased in the disjunctive, Agins' 'substantially advances'
language has been read to announce a stand-alone regulatory takings test that
is wholly independent of Penn Central or any other test.").
44. See id. at 2087.
45. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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advances" test survives only in such cases as Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission4 6 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard,47 where the regulatory authority exacts some kind of
concession-such as an easement-in return for granting
permission to build on or otherwise use property. As a result
of Lingle, state and local authorities can now regulate land
use to their hearts' content, except in exaction cases such as
Nollan and Dolan, free from any takings liability as long as
they do not deprive the landowner of all economically viable
use of the land.
I have to say that I was surprised by the decisiveness
with which the Court rejected the Agins "substantially
advances" test. I had assumed that the Agins test was valid
in challenges to zoning regulations and had dissented only on
the ground that it should not be extended to rent control.
48 I
entirely agree with the Court's decision to abandon Agins, but
I had not argued for it in my dissent, and I hardly expected
it. 49
IV. SAN REMO HOTEL V. CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
Third, San Remo Hotel,50 another regulatory takings
case. The San Remo Hotel is a sixty-two-unit, three-story
hotel near Fisherman's Wharf in San Francisco. 1 About
twenty-five years ago, San Francisco became concerned about
the conversion of residential hotels into tourist hotels on the
ground that the shortage of residential hotel rooms
contributes to homelessness.52 In 1990, the hotel applied to
San Francisco for permission to convert the hotel from a
mixed use to an exclusively tourist use.53 The city allowed the
conversion, but only on the condition that the hotel pay a so-
46. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
47. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
48. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Lingle, 363 F.3d 846, 858-61 (9th Cir. 2004)
(W. Fletcher, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125
S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
49. See id.
50. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491
(2005).
51. Id. at 2495.
52. See San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 125-
28 (Cal. 2002).
53. San Remo Hotel, 125 S. Ct. at 2496.
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called "in lieu" fee of $567,000.1'
The hotel challenged this fee in state court under various
provisions of state law, but the action was stayed by
agreement of the parties while the hotel pursued a federal
takings suit in federal court.55 The Ninth Circuit, however,
held that the district court should abstain under Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.56 to allow the state court
to rule on all questions of state law presented in the case in
the hope that the state court decision would allow the federal
court to avoid ruling on the federal takings question. The
Ninth Circuit noted that under England v. Louisiana State
Board of Medical Examiners," the hotel could reserve any
federal questions for later decision by the federal district
court.5 9
The hotel then reactivated its state court suit, but
explicitly reserved its federal takings claim under England
for later decision by the federal court." The state court
proceeded to rule against the hotel on its state-law takings
claim, noting that California and federal takings law were the
same on the relevant issues presented in the case.6
After the state court decision became final, the hotel
came back to federal court to litigate the federal takings claim
it thought it had reserved.2 But the hotel was now met by a
defense of issue preclusion, given that the state court had
already decided the takings issue under state law, and given
that state and federal takings law were the same in relevant
part.6" The preclusion argument was based on 28 U.S.C. §
1738, which requires a federal court to give the same
preclusive effect to a state court judgment as the courts of
that state would give that judgment.' 4
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. R.R. Comm'n ofTex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
57. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1105
(9th Cir. 1998), affd, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005).
58. England v. La. State Bd. ofMed. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
59. San Remo Hotel, 145 F.3d at 1106 n.7.
60. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 91 n.1
(Cal. 2002).
61. Id. at 109.
62. See San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088
(9th Cir. 2004).
63. Id. at 1090.
64. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491,
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In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that,
despite the hotel's effort to reserve its federal takings
question under England, § 1738 required that preclusive
effect be given to the state court judgment in accordance with
California's law of issue preclusion.65 Just on these facts, San
Remo Hotel is interesting enough. But Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, went on to discuss more generally
the interrelationship between § 1738 and Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City.66
In Williamson County, the Court had held that a federal
regulatory takings claim is not ripe for decision by a federal
court until a landowner has obtained a final determination
from the state-including a decision from the state courts-as
to what the state will actually do, and whether the landowner
will be compensated." Williamson County means that all
state-law aspects of regulatory takings claims must first be
litigated in state court. Only when state court litigation is
finished and the state court has ruled against the landowner
may that landowner come into federal court with a takings
claim based on federal law. On its facts, San Remo Hotel
holds that issue preclusion applies under § 1738-that is,
preclusion applies to issues actually litigated and decided in
the state court.6
But Justice Stevens's discussion in San Remo Hotel of
Williamson County and § 1738 appears to extend to claim
preclusion as well.6 9 I conclude from his discussion that the
most likely reading of San Remo Hotel is that a federal court
must apply both forms of res judicata: issue preclusion and
claim preclusion. All states have some version of use-it-or-
lose-it claim preclusion, requiring a litigant to raise all
related claims in the same proceeding on pain of not being
2500 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) ("Such Acts, records and judicial
proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory
or Possession from which they are taken.").
65. San Remo Hotel, 125 S. Ct. at 2503.
66. See id. at 2504-06.
67. Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172,
194-95 (1985).
68. See San Remo Hotel, 125 S. Ct. at 2501-02.
69. See id. at 2500-07.
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able to raise them in a later proceeding. California's version
is a little less expansive than that of some other states,7" but
even in California this requirement has real bite.
If I am right that this is how San Remo Hotel should be
read-and I am pretty sure that I am-the practical effect of
the Court's decision is that there can be no regulatory takings
litigation challenging state and local land use regulation in
federal district court. That is, Williamson County requires
that suits involving potential federal regulatory takings
claims first be litigated in state court. Only after the
landowner has lost in state court does she have a ripe federal
takings claim. But once the landowner has lost in state court,
there is a Catch-22. She may have a federal takings claim,
but § 1738 prevents her from litigating it in federal court.
If the landowner presented her federal takings claim to
the state court along with her state takings claim, or if the
state and federal law of takings is the same in that state, the
landowner will be precluded from relitigating the issues in
that federal claim in federal court by § 1738 and the state law
of issue preclusion. That is the direct holding of San Remo
Hotel.
If, on the other hand, the landowner did not present a
federal takings claim to the state court-presenting only
state-law takings claim to the state court-she will be
precluded by claim preclusion from litigating the federal
claim in federal court, for under state preclusion law she
almost certainly would have been required to bring that
related federal takings claim in state court along with her
state-law claim. This is not the direct holding of San Remo
Hotel, but it is by far the most likely reading of the Court's
discussion of the interrelationship between Williamson
County and § 1738.
Four of the nine justices in San Remo Hotel did not
concur in Justice Stevens's opinion, but rather merely
concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, agreed with the
majority that the combination of Williamson County and §
70. See generally Walter M. Meiser, California's Unpredictable Res Judicata
(Claim Preclusion) Doctrine, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 559 (1998) (discussing
California's claim preclusion doctrine).
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1738 required the result reached by the majority.7 But they
argued that Williamson County was a mistake and should be
reconsidered. 72 Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted that he had
joined the Court's opinion in Williamson County, but
suggested that it should be cut back such that a federal
takings claim should be considered ripe as soon as all state
administrative procedures have been exhausted.73 In his
view, there should be no requirement that state judicial
procedures be exhausted.74 The reason for his proposed
revision of Williamson County is precisely the reading of San
Remo Hotel that I have just suggested-that the combination
of Williamson County (in its current form) and § 1738
effectively relegates all litigation regarding federal takings
challenges to state and local land use regulations to the state
courts. The federal-law aspects of state court decisions may
be reviewed on certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court, but an occasional policy-setting decision by the
Supreme Court is far different from retail, case-by-case
litigation in federal district court.
V. THE FUTURE OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE AFTER KELO,
LINGLE, AND CHEVRON
So where do these three decisions leave us? The takings
problem-both true takings and regulatory takings-is
notoriously intractable. The problem, and its resolution, are
easy to state in general terms: a single person or an
identifiable small group of people should not have to bear a
burden that in fairness should be borne by the public at large.
But the precise meaning of the "shoulds" in the previous
sentence has been a matter of considerable debate,
challenging some of the best judicial and academic minds over
the past century.
Taken together, these three decisions represent a
substantial change-entirely in the direction of relegating
takings issues to the political and legal judgments of the
states. In Kelo, the Supreme Court endorsed a broad reading
of the "public use" requirement. Kelo effectively gives the
71. See San Remo Hotel, 125 S. Ct. at 2507-08.
72. See id. at 2507-10.
73. See id. at 2509-10.
74. See id. at 2507-10.
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green light to state and local redevelopment projects as long
as there is a sufficient degree of planning by the
redevelopment authority and as long as that authority can
avoid the "stupid staffer" problem 75 of admitting that purely
private gain, rather than public use, is intended by the
project.
The defenders of New London's redevelopment project
argued on two grounds that Kelo made no new law. First,
they argued that various analogues to redevelopment projects
have been endorsed under the "public use" heading almost
from the beginning of the Republic.76 Second, they stressed
that Berman and Midkiff have reaffirmed this principle in
this century.77 I will not pause to argue nineteenth-century
precedents, but I will point out that, for the reasons given by
Justice O'Connor in her dissent, the redevelopment project
approved in Kelo is substantially different from those in
Berman and Midkiff. Even if the Court's decision in Kelo is
not, in fact, a substantial broadening of prior law, it can
plausibly be seen as such.
In Lingle, the Court eliminated the "substantially
advances" test from the regulatory takings analysis,
significantly broadening the regulatory power of state and
local authorities in land use cases.78 After Lingle, the only
regulatory takings test is whether the regulation effectively
takes away all economically viable use of the property.
Finally, in San Remo Hotel, the Court held that the
combination of Williamson County and § 1738 effectively
requires that all regulatory takings claims against state and
local authorities be presented to state courts. 79 After San
Remo Hotel, it will be impossible to bring a regulatory takings
challenge in federal district court. With the exception of the
75. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992) ("In
Justice Blackmun's [dissenting] view, even with respect to regulations that
deprive an owner of all developmental or economically beneficial land uses, the
test for required compensation is whether the legislature has recited a harm-
preventing justification for its action. Since such a justification can be
formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the
legislature has a stupid staff.").
76. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2662-63 & nn.7 & 9
(2005).
77. See id. at 2662-64.
78. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2074 (2005).
79. San Remo Hotel v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491,
2492 (2005).
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Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction, the state courts are
now the exclusive protectors of private property owners
against takings effected by state and local authorities.
Kelo and Lingle represent broad delegations of land use
decisions to the political bodies of state and local
governments. After Kelo, the "public use" test under federal
law will be easily satisfied for virtually all redevelopment
projects authorized by state or local redevelopment agencies.
After Lingle, a regulatory taking will be found under federal
law only when the regulation has made the property
effectively worthless. Local redevelopment agencies, as well
as local zoning boards, have thus been given enormous leeway
under federal law that they arguably did not have before
Kelo, and certainly did not have before Lingle.
As a complement to Kelo and Lingle, San Remo Hotel
represents a complete delegation of land-use regulatory
takings challenges to state judicial bodies. Not only is federal
regulatory takings law substantially less restrictive on state
and local political bodies under Kelo and Lingle, but now,
under San Remo Hotel, what restrictions are left will be
enforceable only in state court.
It may be heresy to suggest, so soon after these decisions
have come down, that two of them may not endure. Kelo has
aroused enormous popular opposition. s° Its practical impact
will almost certainly be blunted by various state and local
legislative initiatives,"1 as indeed Justice Stevens suggested it
might be.82 But I also think it is possible that the Supreme
Court may eventually overrule it, following the example of
the Michigan Supreme Court in the infamous Poletown case, 3
finding a more restrictive "public use" requirement than it
80. Kelo and the opposition it aroused were frequently discussed during the
confirmation hearings for Chief Justice Roberts. See On Eminent Domain,
Supreme Court Workload, End of Life and Consistency, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
2005, at A28.
81. Bills to limit condemnation powers have been introduced in at least
thirty-one states. See, e.g., Terry Pristin, Eminent Domain Revisited: A
Minnesota Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at C9.
82. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005).
83. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455
(Mich. 1981). The Michigan Supreme Court recently recognized the error of
Poletown in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004), but
also identified circumstances where the transfer of condemned private property
to private entities could nevertheless be constitutional. See id. at 474-76.
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was willing to find in Kelo. 4
Unlike Kelo, San Remo Hotel has gone essentially
unremarked in the popular press (and, to a remarkable
degree, in the academic and professional press). In practical
terms, however, San Remo Hotel may be a far more important
case than Kelo. Jurisdiction stripping statutes, which deprive
the federal courts of authority to decide cases, have often
been suggested by political actors who wish to avoid the
consequences of substantive decisions by the United States
Supreme Court in certain controversial areas of the law. For
the most part, such statutes have not been enacted into law,
and those few that have been enacted have been interpreted
narrowly by the Supreme Court. But in San Remo Hotel, the
jurisdiction stripping has been accomplished by the Court
itself.
Both Kelo and San Remo Hotel were decided by five to
four votes, and both were decided before the appointments of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. But the mere change
of personnel will not result in the reversal of these decisions,
for Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor disagreed
with the majority in both cases. In Kelo, they were in dissent;
in San Remo Hotel, they merely concurred in the judgment.
Consequently, if either of these two decisions is to be cut back
or reversed, this will have to result from a change of mind
rather than a change of Justices. But as we have just seen in
Lingle, where the Justices changed their mind about Agins
decided twenty-five years before, this can happen. Perhaps
when the Santa Clara Law Review convenes a property law
symposium in 2030, we will be discussing the Supreme
Court's repudiation of Kelo and San Remo Hotel.
84. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Poletown
dissenting judges, 304 N.W.2d at 464, 465).
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